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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMM'N OF MD. v. KINNANE: 
DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY BASED ON RULES 1.5(E) 
AND 8.4(B) & (C) OF THE MARYLAND RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT HELD PROPER WHERE 
VIOLATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED AND NO 
MITIGATING OR COMPELLING EXTENUATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST 
By: Kellie Gombeski 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that attorney disbannent is 
a proper sanction once intentionally dishonest conduct is established 
and there is an absence of mitigating or compelling extenuating 
circumstances. Attorney Grievance Comm 'n of Md. v. Kinnane, 390 
Md. 324, 888 A.2d 1178 (2005). In so holding, the Court adopted the 
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland's recommendation and 
disbarred Thomas Kinnane ("Kinnane") on the grounds that Kinnane 
violated Rules 1.5(e) and 8.4(b) and (c) of the Maryland Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Id. at 340,888 A.2d at 1188. 
While Kinnane was employed by Alexander & Cleaver he met 
Andrew Chau ("Chau"), the manager of regulatory affairs for Shell 
Energy Services ("Shell"), who represented himself to be an attorney. 
Kinnane continued to represent Shell after he left Alexander & 
Cleaver and also perfonned work for Chau's subsequent employer, 
Tractebel Power ("Tractebel"), after Chau left Shell Energy. During 
Kinnane's representation of Shell, his customary practice was to 
invoice Shell for work after it had been completed, rather than collect 
a retainer for future work. However, around July 2001, Chau 
contacted Kinnane and stated that he was authorized by the vice 
president of Shell to pay Kinnane a $70,000 retainer for future work. 
On July 26, 200 1, Kinnane prepared an invoice from his finn, Howes 
& Kinnane, P.C., to Shell for ''Nevada regulatory and government 
relations activities, 2001 session and implementation." On August 8, 
2001, Shell paid $70,000 to Kinnane by electronic transfer and 
Kinnane held the money in the finn's escrow account. Kinnane had 
never received a retainer from Shell before this payment. 
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On or about August 22, 2001, Chau called Kinnane and directed 
him to take the entire retainer as a bonus for all the work he had 
completed in the past at a discounted rate, and further instructed 
Kinnane to issue a $35,000 check to Chau to compensate him for 
referring future business from Shell and its affiliates, including 
Tractebel. That same day, Kinnane transferred $70,000 into the firm's 
operating account, issued a $35,000 check to Andrew Chau & 
Associates, P.C., indicating that it was for "professional fees: 
consulting," and drew himself a check for $35,000 from the firm's 
operating account. After receiving Kinnane's invoice, the vice 
president and another member of Shell contacted Kinnane and 
informed him that the $70,000 payment had not been authorized by 
Shell. Chau then called Kinnane and told him that the invoice "might 
not have been approved." Kinnane believed the issue was an internal 
dispute to be handled between Chau and the supervisors at Shell. 
Subsequently, on April 30, 2003, Chau and Kinnane were charged 
with felony theft in Texas. On June 11, 2003, in the Harris County 
District Court, Kinnane entered a deferred adjudication of guilt. He 
also paid restitution in the amount of $35,000, a fine of $2,000, 
provided information in the prosecution of Chau, and cooperated fully 
with the Bar Counsel's investigation. 
The hearing court found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Kinnane violated Rules 1.5(e) and 8.4(b) and (c) of the Maryland 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing court noted Kinnane 
violated rule 1.5(e) by splitting his fee from Shell with Chau because 
Chau performed no services to earn that portion of the fee and Shell 
never authorized Kinnane to share the fee with Chau. The hearing 
court further held that. the division of fees was not in proportion to the 
work performed since Chau was being compensated for making future 
referrals. The hearing court found that Kinnane's conviction for 
felony theft reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and 
fitness as a lawyer and his misrepresentations were in violation of 
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the hearing court's 
ruling and held there were sufficient facts present to support the 
hearing court's conclusion of law. Id. at 335, 888 A.2d at 1185. The 
Court held that Kinnane could not reasonably have believed that Chau 
had authorization from Shell to pay a bonus to Kinnane to be shared 
with Chau. Id. at 332, 888 A.2d at 1183. Further, Kinnane's 
invoicing of the $70,000 fee, which was unearned, and his invoice 
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evidencing the $35,000 paid to Chau as a professional fee for 
consulting services were dishonest misrepresentations. ld. 
After the hearing court's ruling, Kinnane filed Exceptions to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on two theories. ld. 
First, Kinnane argued there was no evidence supporting the contention 
that it was unreasonable for him to believe that Chau had authorization 
from Shell to pay him a bonus. ld. at 333, 888 A.2d at 1183-84. To 
the contrary, Kinnane argued his actions demonstrated he had a good 
faith belief that the bonus was properly paid. ld. He supported this 
contention by claiming he had no knowledge that Chau would later 
request he split the bonus in half. ld. The Court overruled Kinnane's 
exception and pointed to the facts upon which the hearing court relied. 
ld. at 334-35, 888 A.2d at 1184-85. These facts, which Kinnane took 
no exception to, included the course of dealings between the client and 
Kinnane, the failure on Kinnane' s part to notify the client that the 
payment was not for services already performed, and the large amount 
of the requested payment. Id. 
Kinnane's second exception was the hearing court's refusal to 
admit the Peer Review Panel's Report. ld. at 335, 888 A.2d at 1185. 
The Court of Appeals looked to Maryland Rule 16-473, which governs 
the peer review process and noted the limited role the panel performs. 
ld. The Court held that despite the common sense appeal of 
permitting the use of statements made during the peer review process 
to expose later inconsistencies or intentional misrepresentations, the 
better course was to adapt to the phrase "what happens in Peer Review 
stays in Peer Review." ld. at 338, 888 A.2d at 1186-87 (citing 
Attorney Grievance Cornrn 'n v. Lee, 387 Md. 89, 108, 874 A.2d 897, 
908 (2005)). The Court explained that the peer review process is an 
informal and nonadversarial meeting designed to allow Bar Counsel, 
the respondent attorney, and the complainant to meet and discuss 
issues presented in the complaint. Kinnane, 390 Md. at 336,888 A.2d 
at 1186. The Court further noted that although the panel review 
process is not governed by any formal rules of evidence, it must 
respect lawful privileges and its principal purpose is not to make 
recommendations as to the appropriateness of formal charges. ld. The 
Court held that compelling reasons in this case warranted an insulation 
of peer review panel reports from subsequent disclosure at later stages 
of the attorney discipline, especially considering the reports are non-
binding, non-dispositive and purely recommendatory in nature. ld. at 
338,888 A.2d at 1187. 
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Although Kinnane did not specifically recommend a sanction for 
his conduct, he did contest and urge a penalty short of disbarment. Id. 
The Court of Appeals took notice of the purpose of attorney 
disciplinary proceedings: to protect the public and not to punish the 
erring attorney. Id. at 339, 888 A.2d at 1187. See Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131, 167, 825 A.2d 430, 451 (2003). 
However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland previously established the 
general rule applicable for an attorney's intentionally dishonest 
conduct in Attorney Grievance Comm 'n of Md. v. Vanderlinde, 364 
Md. 376, 413-415, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001). Kinnane, 390 Md. at 
339, 888 A.2d at 1187. According to precedent, in the absence of 
compelling extenuating circumstances, the usual sanction is 
disbarment. Id. In applying Vanderlinde to the case at bar, the Court 
of Appeals held that Kinnane's deliberate dishonesty and intentional 
acts for personal gain required the sanction of disbarment. Id. at 340, 
888 A.2d at 1188. 
In Kinnane, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affIrmed the grounds 
for disbarment in Maryland for violations involving the Maryland 
Rules of Professional Conduct. However, in so holding, the Court 
fashioned a middle ground and held disbarment to be a proper sanction 
only when the attorney's conduct is intentionally dishonest and 
without mitigating or compelling extenuating circumstances. 
